A couple of entries ago, I went on a rant about my favorite stock bugaboo: the share buyback. Today I came across a particularly fatuous discussion of this very topic in Barron's Weekday Trader column of September 16, 2013. Entitled "Seagate: The Shareholder's Friend", the article describes a very aggressive share buyback program that is designed to reduce the company's outstanding shares by 30%, to 250 million shares. An earlier program has already reduced the share count by 26% to 371 million from 500 million over the last three years. Seagate's president is quoted as saying "We don't believe in holding excess cash on our books."
Notably, the article proceeds to draw a comparison with Seagate's main rival in the disk drive business, Western Digital. It says that Seagate's share price is up 30% this year, while Western Digital's is up 50%. The difference is that Western Digital has been investing its "excess cash" in flash memory acquisitions, a strategy Seagate dismisses as premature. The company president is confident that he'll be able to buy mature technology later on.
Now, I am no expert in this business, but I do know that flash drives are vastly quicker than disk drives. For example, the very sexy Ultrabook I'm using to compose this blog boots up in seventeen seconds, due to its advanced flash memory. I also know that flash is upending memory technology across the board. The very biggest players (EMC and IBM) are investing huge sums in this area. So, what I see here is a classic face off between a company committed to financial engineering and one committed to reinvesting in the business.
While both companies have risen sharply over the last three years, that rise is from very low levels following a long period of distress: too much capacity and falling volumes. Seagate bottomed at $3.80, Western Digital at $11.45. Neither, therefore, has been a particularly great investment over a 15 year span. Still, economic recovery coupled with careful capacity management has caused both stocks to soar in the last couple of years.
With its "shareholder friendliness" and 26% buyback, why has Seagate's recovery lagged its rival's? Well, folks, follow the money! As opposed to dividends, which clearly end up in the shareholders' pockets, and are therefore, clearly shareholder friendly, the funds allocated to buybacks have ended up in the pockets of ... the sellers! People who no longer own Seagate (or who own fewer shares) have received the dough. For the rest, it's gone! If that makes you feel like a sucker for loyally staying the course, well ...
Cash comparisons between the companies are eye-opening. Seagate's 2012 ending cash position was nearly identical with the start of the year; Western Digital was up by $1.1 billion. Seagate spent $1.4 billion on stock buybacks, while WD spent $.66 billion. Seagate also spent $518 million on dividends, compared to WD's $181 million. Making the comparison extreme is the fact that Western Digital is 1.55 times the size of Seagate. So, which do you think is the grasshopper, and which the ant?
Why is Seagate up at all? Don't forget about the law of supply and demand. A constant flow of buyback dollars has an effect on the share price. It rises temporarily when there are more buyers than sellers. What I find compelling is that Western Digital is up quite a bit more, with far less tinkering. Clearly, I think, its more sophisticated investors find the pursuit of technology a superior path to shareholder rewards.
So, which company is right? Well, again, I'm no expert. What I do know is that Seagate now has much less cash on hand to buy flash drive technology, or do anything else, for that matter. And once it's retired another 30% of the shares, it will have even less money when the time comes to buy a "mature" flash drive company at sharply higher prices. Hmm, what sounds like the better way to reward shareholders: invest in technology that is clearly the future of the business, or get rid of excess cash while waiting for a better entry point?
What is the likely outcome? Well, if history repeats (or rhymes), Seagate will eventually face a huge financing nut relating to its tardy effort to acquire flash technology. One way to free up cash will be to cut the dividend. Then it will then borrow a ton of money, at much higher rates than today's, or perhaps raise funds in a massive issuance of "new" stock. None of these things will be good for the stock price.
At present, Seagate's per share price is about $40, Western Digital's 65. I see this as a perfect test case for my abhorrence of buybacks. I hereby go on the record with a prediction: five years from now, Western Digital will have significantly outperformed Seagate (not by a few percentage points, but by factors: two, three, four times). Will I actually make the bet (perhaps by shorting Seagate, or establishing option spreads in Western Digital's favor? Probably not. I'm a Bondsman, after all.
Update: Over a year later. The trends I discussed above continue. Seagate's revenue has fallen 4.7% in 2014, while net income has declined even faster, 14.58%. Yet the stock is up 40% for the year (to $56). Why would that be? Well, while the market is rising as a whole, such a sharp rise against a backdrop of dreary financial results can only be understood in the context of stock buybacks. As for Western Digital, its revenue fell much less (1.44%), while its net income has exploded 65%. And Western Digital's price is up even more than Seagate, even though its buyback program is dwarfed by Seagate's. What do you think will happen to Seagate's price when the company stops blowing its cash on buybacks? Western Digital, using far less cash for buybacks and dividends, is investing in the core business. Down the line, I continue to predict that it will outperform Seagate by large margins.
Update: January 2015. Well, I did take a flyer in Western Digital, purchasing out of the money calls and selling at the money calls. The stock flew up, and I ultimately cashed out for a $5,000 profit. No big deal, but a nice confirmation of my read on WDC. As to Seagate, it just announced that it's halting stock buy-backs, now indicating that they only make sense below a stock price of $60. Guess what? The stock immediately dropped 7%. Why? Because folks were counting on further buybacks! Guess what's going to happen going forward? Gravity, folks!
Update: May 2016. Well ... Both stocks have hit hard times. Today Seagate is trading at $18.64, Western Digital at $35.74. Both have been rocked by a slump in sales of personal computers, and both are down roughly 70% from year ago highs. Now, however, Western trades nearly double Seagate. So, even in tough times, its price relative to Seagate has improved sharply. And, despite sharp controversy relating to Western's purchase of flash drive maker Sandisk, the company has solidified its technology going forward. So, it has spent its money on the company's future. And Seagate? It announced ANOTHER $2.5 billion buyback a year ago. The result? The stock has PLUNGED, and now has a preposterous dividend of 13% (200% of net income, while Western's dividend yield is a far more sustainable 5%). All that money, tossed overboard in the name of enhancing shareholder value! Once Seagate cuts its dividend, the stock will face more downward pressure. The company will still have its core technology issue and the prospect of further income erosion. So, I'm fairly sure the gap between the two companies will widen further ... much further. Does that make Western a good buy? Hell if I know. This article is, after all, about the follies of stock buybacks. I think that point is strongly substantiated by this ongoing thread. An arbitrage strategy, shorting Seagate and going long Western might be attractive, but that's no longer my game.
Sunday, September 15, 2013
Thursday, September 12, 2013
Reality vs Hype
In the world of investing, you are subject to an endless flow of hype. At every level, from the most granular (a specific stock, annuity, fund, ETF, REIT, option straddle, etc.) to the broadest (are we on the brink of collapse, or historic opportunity?), experts will bombard you with recommendations to DO SOMETHING NEW! Overwhelmingly, they want you to stop whatever you're doing now, and follow them down a yellow brick road of endless opportunity. They will always make their advice seem irresistable, with pie charts, tables, Powerpoint slides and inspirational videos sweeping you into ... well, usually questionable actions.
The most useful advice I can give you is to remember that the interests of people who come to you unasked are vastly different from yours. Every time you follow such an expert's advice, he or she makes money. Do you? Distressingly, most people have no answer to this question. They swing one way for awhile, then head off in another direction, but ultimately don't know what's working and what isn't.
To do better, long term, you MUST keep track of your own personal results. It is utterly amazing to me that many people have no real idea of how they are doing with their investments. They might look a year-end statements from a brokerage or mutual fund, but usually don't track things more closely.
If you haven't set set up a means of monitoring your investments, both short and long term, then you should start now. If the technology is intimidating, then hire someone to do it. Mind you, hire them to track your investments, not direct them. You should still do the latter, particularly if you're interested in being a Bodacious Bond investor. If you're at all tech savvy, or willing to become so, then there are many tools to help you. Things like Quicken will hold your hand throughout the (frankly painful) setup process. I personally make do, and very well, with a spreadsheet, I use Open Office, which is free, but most folks have a version of Microsoft Excel lying around too.
What you need to do is get a comprehensive listing of what you own, when you got it, what it cost when you got it, and what it's worth now. Money in and money out is exceptionally important. If you're saving regularly (a very very good thing), then you might be building substantial net worth, but still be failing as an investor. Your tracking system should enable you to distinguish between the performance of money already invested, and new money coming in.
Where am I headed with this? Simply put, once you have a detailed tracking system in place, then you are positioned to take charge of future choices. When you bite on a new ETF promising to goose returns by buying commodities, you can see how it actually does, as compared to the glowing, back-tested projections in the brochure. Whenever you do something new, I would strongly recommend including a note as to why you did it. Look at that note regularly, and see how your reasoning has worked out over time. I guarantee this will be a sobering experience, particularly so in the world of stock investing. Even if you own a portfolio richly studded with Microsoft, Google, Facebook, IBM, EMC, etc., you will probably be bewildered by how much less well you have done than all the charts would suggest.
If you are like me, or the huge majority of individual investors, your tracking tool will help you see the vast gap between hype and reality. One key thing you might learn is that hype can come from within just as easily as without. In the grip of enthusiasm (or depression) we are all prone to doing goofy things. Your tracking tool will be relentlessly objective, even if you are not. Most likely, you will, reluctantly or not, come to the realization that a plan is necessary. If you're attracted to bonds (since you've come thing far in my blog, I'm sure you are), then the Bodacious Bond portfolio might be perfect for you. And note one thing: I won't make a dime off of you! This blog is a labor of love after all.
The most useful advice I can give you is to remember that the interests of people who come to you unasked are vastly different from yours. Every time you follow such an expert's advice, he or she makes money. Do you? Distressingly, most people have no answer to this question. They swing one way for awhile, then head off in another direction, but ultimately don't know what's working and what isn't.
To do better, long term, you MUST keep track of your own personal results. It is utterly amazing to me that many people have no real idea of how they are doing with their investments. They might look a year-end statements from a brokerage or mutual fund, but usually don't track things more closely.
If you haven't set set up a means of monitoring your investments, both short and long term, then you should start now. If the technology is intimidating, then hire someone to do it. Mind you, hire them to track your investments, not direct them. You should still do the latter, particularly if you're interested in being a Bodacious Bond investor. If you're at all tech savvy, or willing to become so, then there are many tools to help you. Things like Quicken will hold your hand throughout the (frankly painful) setup process. I personally make do, and very well, with a spreadsheet, I use Open Office, which is free, but most folks have a version of Microsoft Excel lying around too.
What you need to do is get a comprehensive listing of what you own, when you got it, what it cost when you got it, and what it's worth now. Money in and money out is exceptionally important. If you're saving regularly (a very very good thing), then you might be building substantial net worth, but still be failing as an investor. Your tracking system should enable you to distinguish between the performance of money already invested, and new money coming in.
Where am I headed with this? Simply put, once you have a detailed tracking system in place, then you are positioned to take charge of future choices. When you bite on a new ETF promising to goose returns by buying commodities, you can see how it actually does, as compared to the glowing, back-tested projections in the brochure. Whenever you do something new, I would strongly recommend including a note as to why you did it. Look at that note regularly, and see how your reasoning has worked out over time. I guarantee this will be a sobering experience, particularly so in the world of stock investing. Even if you own a portfolio richly studded with Microsoft, Google, Facebook, IBM, EMC, etc., you will probably be bewildered by how much less well you have done than all the charts would suggest.
If you are like me, or the huge majority of individual investors, your tracking tool will help you see the vast gap between hype and reality. One key thing you might learn is that hype can come from within just as easily as without. In the grip of enthusiasm (or depression) we are all prone to doing goofy things. Your tracking tool will be relentlessly objective, even if you are not. Most likely, you will, reluctantly or not, come to the realization that a plan is necessary. If you're attracted to bonds (since you've come thing far in my blog, I'm sure you are), then the Bodacious Bond portfolio might be perfect for you. And note one thing: I won't make a dime off of you! This blog is a labor of love after all.
Wednesday, December 5, 2012
How Income Streams Dry Up!
Folks, the following is really important! It's worth investing some time to process the points below.
In my last blog, I examined the metaphor of dividends as a sluice diverting some of the broader river of money a company generates. As long as the river is swelling, the sluice can grow too. Earnings growth can be problematic though, and so too can the growth of dividends.
There are many demands made on a company's income stream. Surprisingly, perhaps, one of the greatest threats is the very thing that companies try to generate: cash. As it swells, so too do the temptations to "do" something with it. Some of these things are perfectly fine, even critical. Research and development, infrastructure investments, employee development ... all these might have a big payoff down the line. However, a whole bunch of things are far more questionable. Outsize salaries and bonuses to top management are astonishingly effective in draining money from the income stream. Trophy investments of all kinds can vaporize huge sums of money. Helpful hint: if your hot start-up buys a sports arena or builds a name-brand highrise, run, don't walk, for the exits!
This brings me to one of my biggest gripes: stock buybacks. These are a terrific way to vaporize money. Here's the shill. Take "excess" cash, and use it to buy the company's stock on the open market, thus shrinking the number of shares outstanding. If a company buys up 10% of its stock over a couple of years time, then, in theory, its income will accrue to fewer shareholders. So, their stock will be worth more, and the price will go up! Great idea, right? Actually, it's terrible.
Let's do the math, vastly simplified. Assume a company with $1 million net worth, with $200,000 in cash, and $800,000 in other assets (plant, inventory, patents, etc.). Say it has 100,000 outstanding shares. Say it earns $100,000 a year. How would the this stock be valued? Well, the simplest would be the breakup value: sell off everything and distribute the proceeds to the stockholders. In this case, that would be $10 per share.
In real life, though, those earnings of $100,000 would be the starting point. A company is, after all, usually worth more than its physical assets. It's an earnings machine. Based on opinions about whether the earnings will grow over time, a price/earnings multiple will usually be assigned: say 10 to 1 for a company with average prospects. To that, the cash ($2 per share) would be added, resulting in a price of $12 per share, higher than the breakup value. Note here that cash is a special category. It's not locked up; you can do anything you want with it. You can use it to build the business or protect the business from hard times. You can give it to the investors as a dividend. You can lend it out to others, thus turning it into an income stream. That's why you would add cash in, dollar for dollar, to the per share value of the company.
Now assume a Carl Icahn vulture buys in, and then demands a buyback to "enhance shareholder value," citing the magic of enhanced per-share earnings. There is a HUGE intellectual gap in his presentation, however. Here's a startling idea: if you spend money, then you don't have it. It's like cake. You can look at it, luscious and tantalizing, or you can eat it. You can't do both (at the same time, of course, of course). Yes, earnings per share will rise if you purchase back a portion of the outstanding shares, but the company itself is now worth less, dollar for dollar, than before.
In this example, using the $200,000 in cash to buy 16,666 shares at $12/share will reduce the number of shares outstanding to 83,334. With $100,000 yearly earnings, each share now earns $1.20 a share. Great, right? BUT, you can no longer add in the cash! It's gone! So, applying the same PE multiple of 10 to the $1.20, you end up EXACTLY where you were before, with a stock worth $12 a share. I would argue, strongly, that the company is actually worse less than before, because cash is NOT trash. It's vital to the future of a company, as it can grow sales if properly invested, or at least cushion a company from bad times.
So why does Carl want the company to initiate a buyback? Simply put, it's a great way to make a fast buck. Announcing the buyback, and then initiating it, puts upward pressure on the stock. Suddenly, extra cash is chasing the shares available for sale. Demand outruns supply (temporarily), and the price jumps. So, Carl sells into a rising market, pockets the quick gain, and departs. He could care less about "stockholder value!" He's a scorpion, stinging companies is what he does. Lesson for non-scorpions? Stock buybacks only benefit the folks who sell! Those who stay are left with a company whose cash has been frittered away to others. I think it's a form of financial rape
.
But, you ask, why couldn't the game go on ... forever? That is, if buying stock back puts upward pressure on the price, then a permanent buyback program would permanently lift stock prices, thus rewarding shareholders precisely as planned.
Asking the question pretty much answers it. No stock buyback program is permanent. No company ever promises it. They can't, and would be idiots to do it. The future is unknowable, and stock buybacks are, by and large, expensive. When the money runs short, the buybacks cease. Gravity ensues.
Even if the money didn't run short (and it almost always does), you would still run into the law of diminishing returns. Eventually, the company will have bought all the outstanding stock, at ever-rising prices. The last man standing (Michael Dell perhaps) owns a single hugely expensive share, and the company is no longer public. What would you call a game where you're buying something that gets more and more expensive, precisely because you're buying it? The Hunt brothers discovered the answer when they tried to corner the silver market.
If you look at the history of stock repurchases, it becomes clear that they are a zero-sum game. Any rise in the stock price is due largely to increased, and temporary, demand. Once that demand is met (i.e., once the company stops the buy-back), the price settles right back. Why do companies stop their purchases? Lots of reasons. A common one is that they never intended to complete the buyback. They rely on the announcement to goose the price, and quietly shelve the buy-back after a few months. Equally common is the economic cycle. Buybacks occur when money is plentiful. An economic downturn ends the game instantly.
This brings me to the question of timing. Executives who decide to pump earnings by repurchasing stock have, historically, had terrible timing. Invariably, they initiate buybacks when times are good, and cash is burning a hole in their pockets. Then, once the economy has cratered (it happens pretty regularly), they suddenly hoard the cash like ... gold! In fact, companies will, facing economic distress, often issue stock at distress prices in order to shore up their cash reserves. This is classic buy-high sell-low behavior. Guess who pays the price? It's not the CEOs, who typically get massive bonuses when the stock is up (due to buy-back jiggering), and then float away on golden parachutes once the shit has encountered the inevitable fan.
Occasionally you will see a company like IBM, which has bought back a large amount of stock, and still seen the stock price rise over time. Does this constitute proof that stock buybacks are the reason? Quite the contrary, I would argue. IBM has been very good at increasing revenues, even to the point that stock buybacks dwindle against the income growth. Where would investors be if IBM had diverted this cash to dividends instead? Far better off, I would insist. The money would be in the hands of the stockholders now, instead of in the hands of departed sellers.
One of the worst abuses of the stock buy-back is to fund employee and executive bonuses. The company plumps down a pile of cash, and then hands the stock over to the hired hands. So, the stock isn't retired at all, the PE ratio is not lowered at all, and the stock owners have their ownership diluted (as they now own a company worth less than before). This might be OK, if these incentives actually worked. There is, however, almost no evidence that it does. The explosion of executive compensation in the 2000-2012 period has no relationship to the performance of the companies at all! Since this was a period of relative stagnation, a rational system would have frozen executive salaries during the decade.
What can you do about all this? Very little directly. You should, however, use the information to control your enthusiasm about the next hot stock. Your company may grow from an acorn to the heavens, and you still might not reap even a fraction of the rewards. If you are thinking about a given stock, take a close look at its recent record of employee compensation and incentives. If they're at the high end, then you may be sure that management's interests are no longer aligned with yours. You'd be better off avoiding a train due for a crash. You can be sure that those discredited CEOs and CFOs will not lose a dime in the pileup, but you will lose a sock-full.
If a company really intends to reward its shareholders, there is a very simple way to do it: the dividend! Here is the ideal: a regular, sustainable dividend, adjusted periodically for inflation and income growth, but modest enough to leave the company with sufficient cash to grow the business. Old fashioned, isn't it? Alas, if only this simple recipe weren't so damnably difficult to do (as I pointed out in an earlier blog)!
To return to my broader theme, can you see a little better why I prefer bonds?
In my last blog, I examined the metaphor of dividends as a sluice diverting some of the broader river of money a company generates. As long as the river is swelling, the sluice can grow too. Earnings growth can be problematic though, and so too can the growth of dividends.
There are many demands made on a company's income stream. Surprisingly, perhaps, one of the greatest threats is the very thing that companies try to generate: cash. As it swells, so too do the temptations to "do" something with it. Some of these things are perfectly fine, even critical. Research and development, infrastructure investments, employee development ... all these might have a big payoff down the line. However, a whole bunch of things are far more questionable. Outsize salaries and bonuses to top management are astonishingly effective in draining money from the income stream. Trophy investments of all kinds can vaporize huge sums of money. Helpful hint: if your hot start-up buys a sports arena or builds a name-brand highrise, run, don't walk, for the exits!
This brings me to one of my biggest gripes: stock buybacks. These are a terrific way to vaporize money. Here's the shill. Take "excess" cash, and use it to buy the company's stock on the open market, thus shrinking the number of shares outstanding. If a company buys up 10% of its stock over a couple of years time, then, in theory, its income will accrue to fewer shareholders. So, their stock will be worth more, and the price will go up! Great idea, right? Actually, it's terrible.
Let's do the math, vastly simplified. Assume a company with $1 million net worth, with $200,000 in cash, and $800,000 in other assets (plant, inventory, patents, etc.). Say it has 100,000 outstanding shares. Say it earns $100,000 a year. How would the this stock be valued? Well, the simplest would be the breakup value: sell off everything and distribute the proceeds to the stockholders. In this case, that would be $10 per share.
In real life, though, those earnings of $100,000 would be the starting point. A company is, after all, usually worth more than its physical assets. It's an earnings machine. Based on opinions about whether the earnings will grow over time, a price/earnings multiple will usually be assigned: say 10 to 1 for a company with average prospects. To that, the cash ($2 per share) would be added, resulting in a price of $12 per share, higher than the breakup value. Note here that cash is a special category. It's not locked up; you can do anything you want with it. You can use it to build the business or protect the business from hard times. You can give it to the investors as a dividend. You can lend it out to others, thus turning it into an income stream. That's why you would add cash in, dollar for dollar, to the per share value of the company.
Now assume a Carl Icahn vulture buys in, and then demands a buyback to "enhance shareholder value," citing the magic of enhanced per-share earnings. There is a HUGE intellectual gap in his presentation, however. Here's a startling idea: if you spend money, then you don't have it. It's like cake. You can look at it, luscious and tantalizing, or you can eat it. You can't do both (at the same time, of course, of course). Yes, earnings per share will rise if you purchase back a portion of the outstanding shares, but the company itself is now worth less, dollar for dollar, than before.
In this example, using the $200,000 in cash to buy 16,666 shares at $12/share will reduce the number of shares outstanding to 83,334. With $100,000 yearly earnings, each share now earns $1.20 a share. Great, right? BUT, you can no longer add in the cash! It's gone! So, applying the same PE multiple of 10 to the $1.20, you end up EXACTLY where you were before, with a stock worth $12 a share. I would argue, strongly, that the company is actually worse less than before, because cash is NOT trash. It's vital to the future of a company, as it can grow sales if properly invested, or at least cushion a company from bad times.
So why does Carl want the company to initiate a buyback? Simply put, it's a great way to make a fast buck. Announcing the buyback, and then initiating it, puts upward pressure on the stock. Suddenly, extra cash is chasing the shares available for sale. Demand outruns supply (temporarily), and the price jumps. So, Carl sells into a rising market, pockets the quick gain, and departs. He could care less about "stockholder value!" He's a scorpion, stinging companies is what he does. Lesson for non-scorpions? Stock buybacks only benefit the folks who sell! Those who stay are left with a company whose cash has been frittered away to others. I think it's a form of financial rape
.
But, you ask, why couldn't the game go on ... forever? That is, if buying stock back puts upward pressure on the price, then a permanent buyback program would permanently lift stock prices, thus rewarding shareholders precisely as planned.
Asking the question pretty much answers it. No stock buyback program is permanent. No company ever promises it. They can't, and would be idiots to do it. The future is unknowable, and stock buybacks are, by and large, expensive. When the money runs short, the buybacks cease. Gravity ensues.
Even if the money didn't run short (and it almost always does), you would still run into the law of diminishing returns. Eventually, the company will have bought all the outstanding stock, at ever-rising prices. The last man standing (Michael Dell perhaps) owns a single hugely expensive share, and the company is no longer public. What would you call a game where you're buying something that gets more and more expensive, precisely because you're buying it? The Hunt brothers discovered the answer when they tried to corner the silver market.
If you look at the history of stock repurchases, it becomes clear that they are a zero-sum game. Any rise in the stock price is due largely to increased, and temporary, demand. Once that demand is met (i.e., once the company stops the buy-back), the price settles right back. Why do companies stop their purchases? Lots of reasons. A common one is that they never intended to complete the buyback. They rely on the announcement to goose the price, and quietly shelve the buy-back after a few months. Equally common is the economic cycle. Buybacks occur when money is plentiful. An economic downturn ends the game instantly.
This brings me to the question of timing. Executives who decide to pump earnings by repurchasing stock have, historically, had terrible timing. Invariably, they initiate buybacks when times are good, and cash is burning a hole in their pockets. Then, once the economy has cratered (it happens pretty regularly), they suddenly hoard the cash like ... gold! In fact, companies will, facing economic distress, often issue stock at distress prices in order to shore up their cash reserves. This is classic buy-high sell-low behavior. Guess who pays the price? It's not the CEOs, who typically get massive bonuses when the stock is up (due to buy-back jiggering), and then float away on golden parachutes once the shit has encountered the inevitable fan.
Occasionally you will see a company like IBM, which has bought back a large amount of stock, and still seen the stock price rise over time. Does this constitute proof that stock buybacks are the reason? Quite the contrary, I would argue. IBM has been very good at increasing revenues, even to the point that stock buybacks dwindle against the income growth. Where would investors be if IBM had diverted this cash to dividends instead? Far better off, I would insist. The money would be in the hands of the stockholders now, instead of in the hands of departed sellers.
One of the worst abuses of the stock buy-back is to fund employee and executive bonuses. The company plumps down a pile of cash, and then hands the stock over to the hired hands. So, the stock isn't retired at all, the PE ratio is not lowered at all, and the stock owners have their ownership diluted (as they now own a company worth less than before). This might be OK, if these incentives actually worked. There is, however, almost no evidence that it does. The explosion of executive compensation in the 2000-2012 period has no relationship to the performance of the companies at all! Since this was a period of relative stagnation, a rational system would have frozen executive salaries during the decade.
What can you do about all this? Very little directly. You should, however, use the information to control your enthusiasm about the next hot stock. Your company may grow from an acorn to the heavens, and you still might not reap even a fraction of the rewards. If you are thinking about a given stock, take a close look at its recent record of employee compensation and incentives. If they're at the high end, then you may be sure that management's interests are no longer aligned with yours. You'd be better off avoiding a train due for a crash. You can be sure that those discredited CEOs and CFOs will not lose a dime in the pileup, but you will lose a sock-full.
If a company really intends to reward its shareholders, there is a very simple way to do it: the dividend! Here is the ideal: a regular, sustainable dividend, adjusted periodically for inflation and income growth, but modest enough to leave the company with sufficient cash to grow the business. Old fashioned, isn't it? Alas, if only this simple recipe weren't so damnably difficult to do (as I pointed out in an earlier blog)!
To return to my broader theme, can you see a little better why I prefer bonds?
Saturday, December 1, 2012
Income Streams, Upriver and Down
I just love bonds, but, as I said in my last post, I can't recommend them right now. Well, that's not strictly true; it's just that I can't recommend my favorite investing technique, which involves the regular purchase of BAA 30-year bonds. Yields are simply too low; rising rates will trash principal if you buy at today's inflated prices.
So, what should you do? In the frantic hunt for yield, the flavor of the month is the high-dividend stock, particularly one with rising dividends. Do the math, say the gurus: even a stock with a moderate dividend will beat bonds handily if that dividend grows over time. They spin lovely scenarios like this: a company with a 3% dividend increases that dividend steadily over a ten-year period, say at a rate of 5% annually. So, a $100 stock will initially yield $3. After ten years of growing at a 5% rate, that $3 becomes nearly $5. Assuming the price/earnings ratio stays the same, that $100 stock is now worth $166! Add in the cumulative dividends (say $40), and you've doubled your money! Factor in the favorable tax treatment (15%) given to dividends, and you've beaten bonds to death! Lovely, right?
As I've pointed out before, there serious problems with the scenario. They derive, in the main, from the fact that dividends and interest are very different things. In the broadest sense, both are sluices from a larger income stream. What is the larger stream? Well, it's the money a company generates by doing what it does: lending money, selling automobiles, refining copper, brewing up syrup-laden lattes, etc. Interest is one of the company's core expenses whereas dividends are diverted from the income stream after expenses are paid. Logically, therefore, interest comes first and dividends trail, badly.
If a company's expenses rise more rapidly than its ability to increase sales or raise prices, then the viability of the dividend is jeopardized. THAT, folks, is exactly what happens, over and over and over. A company will establish a very nice record of paying steadily rising dividends, only to cut them severely, or even eliminate them, when tough times arrive. This isn't a rarity; it's predictable. Yes, recessions do damage a company's cash flow, and perhaps its ability to pay the dividend. But they are also a great excuse for cutting back on an obligation that will become unsustainable in the future. That is partly why dividends were pared so savagely in 2008/9 and 2001/2. In fact, EVERY recession brings waves of dividend cuts. You can count on them, and they absolutely trash the lovely scenario painted above. The haircut is twofold: you get less income, and the stock price drops to account for the diminished payout. It can take years to recover.
Instead of running off after yield alternatives, my advice is to be patient. If you're lucky enough to be receiving regular interest payments from a Bodacious portfolio, you can just sit on the money for awhile. To that money you can add redemptions (remember, you've laddered BAA bonds over a 30-year spectrum). Cash and cash equivalents will build steadily.
You will probably be surprised how rapidly today's low-interest environment will fade. Until then, I suggest you stick with bonds: just of a different type. If you look for investment grade bonds with a 1-2 year maturity, you'll discover that it's perfectly feasible to capture yields in the 2.5% to 3% range. That's generous enough to pay your taxes and cover today's inflation as well. Yeah, you're not gonna get ahead, but you're not falling behind either. Sometimes, staying even is a very good thing, all by itself. As bond income and redemption cash comes in, you can ladder your purchases, buying 1-2 years out, two or three times a year.
Then, you wait, like a spider. Eventually, rates will rise. Eventually, they will rise enough to let you go out on the maturity spectrum, and capture yields that will beat inflation and taxes, and still leave you a generous return. If you get to one of those rare moments when yields have soared, and prices plunged, then you can go for the long bomb: using leverage to lock in cyclically peak yields.
So, what should you do? In the frantic hunt for yield, the flavor of the month is the high-dividend stock, particularly one with rising dividends. Do the math, say the gurus: even a stock with a moderate dividend will beat bonds handily if that dividend grows over time. They spin lovely scenarios like this: a company with a 3% dividend increases that dividend steadily over a ten-year period, say at a rate of 5% annually. So, a $100 stock will initially yield $3. After ten years of growing at a 5% rate, that $3 becomes nearly $5. Assuming the price/earnings ratio stays the same, that $100 stock is now worth $166! Add in the cumulative dividends (say $40), and you've doubled your money! Factor in the favorable tax treatment (15%) given to dividends, and you've beaten bonds to death! Lovely, right?
As I've pointed out before, there serious problems with the scenario. They derive, in the main, from the fact that dividends and interest are very different things. In the broadest sense, both are sluices from a larger income stream. What is the larger stream? Well, it's the money a company generates by doing what it does: lending money, selling automobiles, refining copper, brewing up syrup-laden lattes, etc. Interest is one of the company's core expenses whereas dividends are diverted from the income stream after expenses are paid. Logically, therefore, interest comes first and dividends trail, badly.
If a company's expenses rise more rapidly than its ability to increase sales or raise prices, then the viability of the dividend is jeopardized. THAT, folks, is exactly what happens, over and over and over. A company will establish a very nice record of paying steadily rising dividends, only to cut them severely, or even eliminate them, when tough times arrive. This isn't a rarity; it's predictable. Yes, recessions do damage a company's cash flow, and perhaps its ability to pay the dividend. But they are also a great excuse for cutting back on an obligation that will become unsustainable in the future. That is partly why dividends were pared so savagely in 2008/9 and 2001/2. In fact, EVERY recession brings waves of dividend cuts. You can count on them, and they absolutely trash the lovely scenario painted above. The haircut is twofold: you get less income, and the stock price drops to account for the diminished payout. It can take years to recover.
Instead of running off after yield alternatives, my advice is to be patient. If you're lucky enough to be receiving regular interest payments from a Bodacious portfolio, you can just sit on the money for awhile. To that money you can add redemptions (remember, you've laddered BAA bonds over a 30-year spectrum). Cash and cash equivalents will build steadily.
You will probably be surprised how rapidly today's low-interest environment will fade. Until then, I suggest you stick with bonds: just of a different type. If you look for investment grade bonds with a 1-2 year maturity, you'll discover that it's perfectly feasible to capture yields in the 2.5% to 3% range. That's generous enough to pay your taxes and cover today's inflation as well. Yeah, you're not gonna get ahead, but you're not falling behind either. Sometimes, staying even is a very good thing, all by itself. As bond income and redemption cash comes in, you can ladder your purchases, buying 1-2 years out, two or three times a year.
Then, you wait, like a spider. Eventually, rates will rise. Eventually, they will rise enough to let you go out on the maturity spectrum, and capture yields that will beat inflation and taxes, and still leave you a generous return. If you get to one of those rare moments when yields have soared, and prices plunged, then you can go for the long bomb: using leverage to lock in cyclically peak yields.
Friday, October 19, 2012
A Dead End ... For Now
Well, the ride goes on, but I can no longer suggest climbing aboard. I just did a scan on E*Trade to find investment grade bonds yielding more than 7% yearly. The only things that came up were some AMR bonds. Guess what? These puppies are in default, despite their BBB ratings from Moody's. Folks, the risk/reward ratio has slanted decisively toward risk.
All along, I have talked about buying long-term bonds at or below par, with yields high enough to compensate for inflation. Taking into account the unprecedented opportunities afforded by margin rates hovering around 1.25%, this has meant that rich yields of 10-12% have been within reach. Well, this is still true, technically. You can still find the odd issue selling around par, with a 7% coupon. Applying 50% margin (borrowing $5,000 of a $10,000 purchase) would incur a mere $62.50 in interest, reducing the return to $637.5 for that 7% bond. So, you will still score a 12.75% return on that $5000 investment. So, what could go wrong?
LOTS of things. Just because inflation has been hiding for the past five years doesn't mean it's gone forever. A real uptick will swirl through the bond world in no time. A bond trading at par to yield 7% will suddenly be worth only $.875 when rates go to 8%. No problem if you're in for the long haul, but a massive one if you need the money anytime soon.
Also, an uptick in inflation might drastically affect margin rates. Just imagine the present margin rate going up to 3% from today's 1.25%. Now your nearly return is only $550, still over 10%, if you can ignore the capital loss of $1250 on paper.
Historically, from 1946 through 2012, the Moody's BAA seasoned rate has been around 7.6. With it hovering around 5% now, even the most exceptional situations are looking shaky. So, it's probably time for a pause. If you're a Bodacious investor following a plan, perhaps you should go ahead and buy something this year, but maybe less than usual. Instead, pay down margin loans with the difference. If you don't have margin debt, then let the money accumulate for awhile. Cash is NOT trash. Even if it just sits around, the loss to inflation is small right now.
One beauty of the market system is that, sooner or later, opportunity always knocks. With the stock market hovering near 5-year highs, it's a good bet that things will get cheaper eventually. When blood is flowing and you're scared out of your wits, it will probably be a good time to put that money to use. With any luck, the opportunities will be there in bonds, which is, as you know, my idea of the way to roll!
All along, I have talked about buying long-term bonds at or below par, with yields high enough to compensate for inflation. Taking into account the unprecedented opportunities afforded by margin rates hovering around 1.25%, this has meant that rich yields of 10-12% have been within reach. Well, this is still true, technically. You can still find the odd issue selling around par, with a 7% coupon. Applying 50% margin (borrowing $5,000 of a $10,000 purchase) would incur a mere $62.50 in interest, reducing the return to $637.5 for that 7% bond. So, you will still score a 12.75% return on that $5000 investment. So, what could go wrong?
LOTS of things. Just because inflation has been hiding for the past five years doesn't mean it's gone forever. A real uptick will swirl through the bond world in no time. A bond trading at par to yield 7% will suddenly be worth only $.875 when rates go to 8%. No problem if you're in for the long haul, but a massive one if you need the money anytime soon.
Also, an uptick in inflation might drastically affect margin rates. Just imagine the present margin rate going up to 3% from today's 1.25%. Now your nearly return is only $550, still over 10%, if you can ignore the capital loss of $1250 on paper.
Historically, from 1946 through 2012, the Moody's BAA seasoned rate has been around 7.6. With it hovering around 5% now, even the most exceptional situations are looking shaky. So, it's probably time for a pause. If you're a Bodacious investor following a plan, perhaps you should go ahead and buy something this year, but maybe less than usual. Instead, pay down margin loans with the difference. If you don't have margin debt, then let the money accumulate for awhile. Cash is NOT trash. Even if it just sits around, the loss to inflation is small right now.
One beauty of the market system is that, sooner or later, opportunity always knocks. With the stock market hovering near 5-year highs, it's a good bet that things will get cheaper eventually. When blood is flowing and you're scared out of your wits, it will probably be a good time to put that money to use. With any luck, the opportunities will be there in bonds, which is, as you know, my idea of the way to roll!
Wednesday, September 12, 2012
The Curious Case of Clear Channel
I've written frequently about bonds and risk. I've highlighted the vast differences between bond holders and stock owners with respect to risk. Time and again, the skittish nature of bond investors leads to enticing opportunities. Most recently, I've highlighted some lovely opportunities in fixed income due to the Euro crisis.
Today, I thought it would be useful to look at my failure. Of all the bond positions I bought from 2008 to the present, I have banked a loss on only one: Clear Channel Communication 7.25% of 10/15/27. My position in these bonds ($10,000 face amount) was one of the very first I made in 2008. The financial crisis was looming, and I was already scared. I had raised $50,000 in cash, anticipating the crisis. I already sensed that the sweet spot would be in bonds. So, I established four positions: Capital One 7.865% of 8/1/66, Limited Brands 6.95% of 3/1/33, and National City Corp 6.875% of 5/15/19, and the infamous Clear Channel notes. All were weakly rated as investment grade, and three proceeded to plunge into junk range. Three of the four issues subsequently rallied smartly, and all now trade at or above par.
Clear Channel is the dog. It descended precipitously into near-default, and is still rated at Moody's Ca, as close to actual default as you can get. The bonds that I purchased at 68 now trade at 50. During the depths of the 2009 panic, though, they traded as low as 8! I eventually pulled the plug on these bonds when they failed to rise above the Cc rating in the couple of years following the trough. I sold at 37, banking a nasty $3100 loss. So, why did I chicken out? Because the darn things violate the very principles I've been expounding, and I couldn't justify the continued risk. Moody's is basically telling the world that they will fail, and probably soon. Who am I to disagree?
Still, there is a whole lot to be learned from this shabby company. Clear Channel Communications went public in 2005 at $18.55, rose to $29.71 at the end of 2007, sank to $2.52 in 2008, and has rallied $5.34. So, a double off the bottom, but a 71% drop from the time the stock debuted. And, the stock's recent action is sickly indeed, down from $14.22 earlier this year, another nasty 64% drop.
A few comparisons between the stock and bond performance are in order. The stock is down 71% from the public start, the bond 50%. Along the way, though, the bond has paid 15 years (it was issued in 1997) of uninterrupted interest, a total that exceeds the initial offering price. Add in the present value of 50, and the bond has still returned 59% over that 15 year period. Not great, but it's still about 3% compounded annually.
Conclusions? Well, this narrative is a tribute to the extreme reluctance of publicly-held companies to default on their debts. Clear Channel is a sick puppy, and will likely fold eventually. But the bond holders have received every penny owed them to date. And in liquidation? Of course, all bets are off. But those bond holders will be in line head of the stock holders. They may still get their money back. The stock holders will almost certainly be out in the cold. So, would I buy these bonds with their present 16% yield? No way. Investing in sewer junk and bankruptcies is a lot like buying stocks: too many variables and imponderables. Lacking insider information and/or industry expertise, I can't gauge whether it's worth the risk.
Mainly, though, the lesson relates to issues higher up on the food chain. Investment grade bonds, particularly at the BAA levels, are the sweet spot of bond investing (hell, of all investing I would argue). They get a massive boost in yield from the ultra-cautious, and yet considerable support from the folks running the companies, who need to be able to keep borrowing. These folks in the management trenches fight heroically to keep their companies afloat, even as blue-bloods get woozy worrying about ... everything.
UPDATE, May 2013: these puppies now trade at $79, above the price I originally paid. So, even here, patience would have paid off, though they might still go glub!
UPDATE: October 2015. Took another peek. To my amazement, these sick sick dogs are still alive, trading at 63.75. Still rated CA/CCC-, utter crap. But still alive after all these years! Conclusion, as above, a tribute to the tenacity of companies in protecting their access to the credit markets. If an when they pay off at par (no, I'm absolutely not predicting this), I'll have a good laugh.
December 2018. Took a final peek. Yes, finally, these sick bonds imploded. TEN years after they sank into deep malaise. And even now the defaulted bonds are selling for 20 cents on the dollar. Now I'm not going to argue that they were ever a good investment, but you'd be surprised how much they would have yielded to an intrepid investor before they took their fatal dive. Worth the stress? No. But a total catastrophe? Not necessarily.
Today, I thought it would be useful to look at my failure. Of all the bond positions I bought from 2008 to the present, I have banked a loss on only one: Clear Channel Communication 7.25% of 10/15/27. My position in these bonds ($10,000 face amount) was one of the very first I made in 2008. The financial crisis was looming, and I was already scared. I had raised $50,000 in cash, anticipating the crisis. I already sensed that the sweet spot would be in bonds. So, I established four positions: Capital One 7.865% of 8/1/66, Limited Brands 6.95% of 3/1/33, and National City Corp 6.875% of 5/15/19, and the infamous Clear Channel notes. All were weakly rated as investment grade, and three proceeded to plunge into junk range. Three of the four issues subsequently rallied smartly, and all now trade at or above par.
Clear Channel is the dog. It descended precipitously into near-default, and is still rated at Moody's Ca, as close to actual default as you can get. The bonds that I purchased at 68 now trade at 50. During the depths of the 2009 panic, though, they traded as low as 8! I eventually pulled the plug on these bonds when they failed to rise above the Cc rating in the couple of years following the trough. I sold at 37, banking a nasty $3100 loss. So, why did I chicken out? Because the darn things violate the very principles I've been expounding, and I couldn't justify the continued risk. Moody's is basically telling the world that they will fail, and probably soon. Who am I to disagree?
Still, there is a whole lot to be learned from this shabby company. Clear Channel Communications went public in 2005 at $18.55, rose to $29.71 at the end of 2007, sank to $2.52 in 2008, and has rallied $5.34. So, a double off the bottom, but a 71% drop from the time the stock debuted. And, the stock's recent action is sickly indeed, down from $14.22 earlier this year, another nasty 64% drop.
A few comparisons between the stock and bond performance are in order. The stock is down 71% from the public start, the bond 50%. Along the way, though, the bond has paid 15 years (it was issued in 1997) of uninterrupted interest, a total that exceeds the initial offering price. Add in the present value of 50, and the bond has still returned 59% over that 15 year period. Not great, but it's still about 3% compounded annually.
Conclusions? Well, this narrative is a tribute to the extreme reluctance of publicly-held companies to default on their debts. Clear Channel is a sick puppy, and will likely fold eventually. But the bond holders have received every penny owed them to date. And in liquidation? Of course, all bets are off. But those bond holders will be in line head of the stock holders. They may still get their money back. The stock holders will almost certainly be out in the cold. So, would I buy these bonds with their present 16% yield? No way. Investing in sewer junk and bankruptcies is a lot like buying stocks: too many variables and imponderables. Lacking insider information and/or industry expertise, I can't gauge whether it's worth the risk.
Mainly, though, the lesson relates to issues higher up on the food chain. Investment grade bonds, particularly at the BAA levels, are the sweet spot of bond investing (hell, of all investing I would argue). They get a massive boost in yield from the ultra-cautious, and yet considerable support from the folks running the companies, who need to be able to keep borrowing. These folks in the management trenches fight heroically to keep their companies afloat, even as blue-bloods get woozy worrying about ... everything.
UPDATE, May 2013: these puppies now trade at $79, above the price I originally paid. So, even here, patience would have paid off, though they might still go glub!
UPDATE: October 2015. Took another peek. To my amazement, these sick sick dogs are still alive, trading at 63.75. Still rated CA/CCC-, utter crap. But still alive after all these years! Conclusion, as above, a tribute to the tenacity of companies in protecting their access to the credit markets. If an when they pay off at par (no, I'm absolutely not predicting this), I'll have a good laugh.
December 2018. Took a final peek. Yes, finally, these sick bonds imploded. TEN years after they sank into deep malaise. And even now the defaulted bonds are selling for 20 cents on the dollar. Now I'm not going to argue that they were ever a good investment, but you'd be surprised how much they would have yielded to an intrepid investor before they took their fatal dive. Worth the stress? No. But a total catastrophe? Not necessarily.
Monday, September 10, 2012
Update to the End of the World
Two blogs ago, I ruminated about events that make people fear the end of the world. I also observed that truly catastrophic events are very rare, and that planning for them is wasted effort.
In the world of bonds, such head fakes can be exceptionally lucrative. The failure of the Western world to implode in 2008-9 led to historic buying opportunities in bonds. More recently, panic among the Chickens Little of the bond world led to some juicy opportunities in a number of dollar denominated European entities. And, I'm pleased to report, reports of the death of the Euro zone are beginning to look premature as well.
Here is a tally of purchases I made earlier this year in response to the crisis:
Abbey National PLC 7.95% bonds of 10/26/29. I bought $50,000 face amount at an average discounted price of 92. They are presently trading around 110, for a paper profit of $9,000, or a 19% capital gain.
AXA SA 8.6% of 2/15/30. I bent my rule of buying at a discount, because of the very high coupon, and bought $45,000 face amount for 1.08, or $48,600. The yield to maturity of these bonds was still over 7.75%. They now trade at 118.5, a 9.5% capital gain on paper ($4,500).
Telefonica Europe B V, 8.25% of 9/15/30. Again, due to the high coupon, I bought 25,000 face amount above part at 103. They now trade at 106 for a small gain.
Telecom Italia 7.2% 7/18/36. Recently bought a $40,000 face amount at 87.25. These now trade at 97, for a $4000 paper profit, or 11%.
Telecom Italia 7.721% 06/04/38, face amount of $15,000 was bought very recently at 98. The position is essentially unchanged.
What's next? Again, who knows? However, the price action of these bonds is telling me that the terror is receding, and these relatively juicy yields will sink further, resulting in larger capital gains. So, will I cash out? By now, you should know my answer. In this day and age, yields pushing 8% are rare indeed, and I intend to hold onto these newer purchases. Remember, my portfolio's yields are enhanced by maintaining roughly 25% margin. With my margin cost at 1.25%, these most recent bonds have an effective yield of 10%! With interest payments arriving twice a year, that 10% compounds a bit.
Bottom line: as long as Ben B. keeps offering money for nearly free, this ride will go on.
Update: 5/13/13. The ride continued, both as to rock-bottom margin costs and favorable price movement.
Abbey 7.95% of 2029 are now at $121.
AXA SA 8.6% of 2/15/30 are $129.51.
Telefonica Europe B V, 8.25% of 9/15/30 are $123.74.
Telecom Italia 7.2% 7/18/36 are $105.43.
Telecom Italia 7.721% 06/04/38 are $110.58.
In retrospect, the Euro-zone bond opportunity seems clear and easy. I can attest that it wasn't. Folks, it's very hard to take action WHILE the end of the world is threatening.
In the world of bonds, such head fakes can be exceptionally lucrative. The failure of the Western world to implode in 2008-9 led to historic buying opportunities in bonds. More recently, panic among the Chickens Little of the bond world led to some juicy opportunities in a number of dollar denominated European entities. And, I'm pleased to report, reports of the death of the Euro zone are beginning to look premature as well.
Here is a tally of purchases I made earlier this year in response to the crisis:
Abbey National PLC 7.95% bonds of 10/26/29. I bought $50,000 face amount at an average discounted price of 92. They are presently trading around 110, for a paper profit of $9,000, or a 19% capital gain.
AXA SA 8.6% of 2/15/30. I bent my rule of buying at a discount, because of the very high coupon, and bought $45,000 face amount for 1.08, or $48,600. The yield to maturity of these bonds was still over 7.75%. They now trade at 118.5, a 9.5% capital gain on paper ($4,500).
Telefonica Europe B V, 8.25% of 9/15/30. Again, due to the high coupon, I bought 25,000 face amount above part at 103. They now trade at 106 for a small gain.
Telecom Italia 7.2% 7/18/36. Recently bought a $40,000 face amount at 87.25. These now trade at 97, for a $4000 paper profit, or 11%.
Telecom Italia 7.721% 06/04/38, face amount of $15,000 was bought very recently at 98. The position is essentially unchanged.
What's next? Again, who knows? However, the price action of these bonds is telling me that the terror is receding, and these relatively juicy yields will sink further, resulting in larger capital gains. So, will I cash out? By now, you should know my answer. In this day and age, yields pushing 8% are rare indeed, and I intend to hold onto these newer purchases. Remember, my portfolio's yields are enhanced by maintaining roughly 25% margin. With my margin cost at 1.25%, these most recent bonds have an effective yield of 10%! With interest payments arriving twice a year, that 10% compounds a bit.
Bottom line: as long as Ben B. keeps offering money for nearly free, this ride will go on.
Update: 5/13/13. The ride continued, both as to rock-bottom margin costs and favorable price movement.
Abbey 7.95% of 2029 are now at $121.
AXA SA 8.6% of 2/15/30 are $129.51.
Telefonica Europe B V, 8.25% of 9/15/30 are $123.74.
Telecom Italia 7.2% 7/18/36 are $105.43.
Telecom Italia 7.721% 06/04/38 are $110.58.
In retrospect, the Euro-zone bond opportunity seems clear and easy. I can attest that it wasn't. Folks, it's very hard to take action WHILE the end of the world is threatening.
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